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American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 47, No. 11, 1419-1427 (2004)
DOI: 10.1177/0002764204265342

Airline Security After the Event

Unintended Consequences and Illusions

Perry A. Russell

University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Frederick W. Preston

University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Interviews with airline and security employees and public information are used to examine the real and perceived outcomes of public policy reactions to the terrorist attacks of September 11. The examination uses the classic functionalist perspective of Robert Merton and the more recent insights of Raymond Boudon. Attempts to reduce the threat of terrorist success and to foster confidence in the flying public had mixed results. Clearly governments and airlines were not well prepared for terrorist attacks, a fact that was well known to insiders but not widely known to the public. Many of the illusions of security that preceded the attacks were exposed by discussions and policy reactions following September 11.

Key Words: terrorism • unintended consequences • airline security • functionalism • perverse effects • TSA


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[Abstract] [PDF]