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The Linkage Between Israel's Military Policies and the Military's Social Composition The Case of the al-Aqsa Intifada

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva, Israel, yagil{at}bgumail.bgu.ac.il

With the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000 and in contrast to past wars, the Israeli state impressively regained its relative autonomous capacity in managing a prolonged military operation without significant internal opposition. Arguably, the state's autonomy increased in light of the alteration of the social composition of the army, from relying on the Ashkenazi middle class to drawing on peripheral and religious social groups. Specifically, this change was reflected in the composition of casualties that reshaped the bereavement ethos from protest to an acceptance of the sacrifice. Concurrently, the field forces exhibited much greater enthusiasm than they had for aggressive missions through which the religious and peripheral groups hoped to prove themselves worthy of status both inside and outside the army.

Key Words: state autonomy • war casualties • army's social composition • soldiers' aggressive conductn

American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 51, No. 11, 1575-1589 (2008)
DOI: 10.1177/0002764208316358


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